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The case materials in the field of Contracts include
those which are normally treated in a law school contracts
course, viz., offer and acceptance, consideration, third-party
beneficiary, assignment, statute of frauds, interpretation
(including parol evidence rule), conditions, breach and dis-
charge, and also quasi-contract cases.
Except rarely, no critical comment on the cases is made
with the thought that the reader, if the case is called to his
attention, should reach his own conclusions about the right-
ness or wrongness of any particular decision.
The material dealing with statutes and opinions of the
Attorney General is likewise limited in scope of subject
matter and treatment. This necessarily excludes a number
of Attorney Generals' opinions dealing with the authority
of municipal corporations and subdivisions of state govern-
ment to enter into contracts.
In the field of Sales only a very small number of cases
has been decided. Here also no critical comment is attempted.
The treatment of insurance cases likewise involves no
critical treatment. The "Indiana Insurance Law" of 1935
has caused a large number of Attorney General opinions.
These were summarized if they related to questions as to
which a general practitioner might be called upon to render
an opinion. Inter-departmental regulations and matters deal-
ing with a single sui generzs problem are not noted.
CONTRACTS
Res Judicata-Anticipatory Repudiation-Split Causes.
Armstrong v. Illinois Bankers Life Association et al. 217
Ind. 601, 29 N.E. (2d) 415, (1940) 181 A.L.R. 769 (1940).
Illinois Bankers Life Association issued a policy of in-
surance October 5, 1927, to one Russell Armstrong provid-
ing for life insurance on his life and for total disability.
Premiums were separately allocated to each provision of in-
surance. Insured made a claim for total disability as of June,




1928, which was disallowed by the Company. The Premiums
were not thereafter paid. The Company lapsed the policy
for non-payment of premiums and denied any liability there-
under. Insured, on December 31, 1929, sued and recovered
damages for breach of the total disability feature of the
policy. Thereafter, Insured assigned all his right, title and
interest in the life insurance portion of the policy to Ger-
trude Armstrong who brought action on the policy. The
Company pleaded the first judgment i.e., the one in favor
of the assured under the disability feature of the policy) as
res judicata. Held, that there were two separate causes of
action and therefore the first judgment was not res judicata
of the facts in the second action.
The case is a modern application of the old rule of res
judicata discussed at some length in the case of Franke v.
Franke.' It is important to note that a single insurance
policy was allowed to be split into two portions, each a
separate contract in effect, so that assignment of one was
allowed and judgment on one was no adjudication of the
other.
The court discussed the problem of anticipatory repu-
diation and possibly over-extended the "election-theory" as
to anticipatory repudiation. Gavit,2 after agreeing with the
result that the first judgment was not res judicata, said:
"The contract in question was a continuing contract, and the
repudiation could not be properly classified as an anticipa-
tory breach and clearly constituted a repudiation. The gen-
erally accepted rule on this subject is that a repudiation
must be accepted as a breach even in the case of an install-
ment contract and that the only cause of action which the
promisee has accrues at the time of the repudiation. Thus
on the second problem involved, which is again a common
type of situation, this decision is questionable."
At page 617 of the opinion, the Court quotes from Fed-
e'al Life Ins. Co. v. Maxam as a controlling precedent. One
should note that the Court in the Maxam case was speaking
of an executory contract, although the contract in that case
was unilaterally executed as in the instant case. Thus, the
instant case is apparent authority in Indiana for the view
1. 15 Ind. App. 529, 43 N. E. 468 (1896).
2. Indiana Pleading and Practice, pp. 786-787.
3. 70 Ind. App. 266, 117 N. E. 801 (1917).
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that in unilaterally performed contracts a breachee has an
election to sue or to continue his performance as in execu-
tory contracts. The case represents no change in Indiana
case laws as reflected by the Maxam case but is noted be-
cause the weight of authority from other jurisdictions ap-
pears to be contra. 4
Accord and Satisfaction. Karvalsky v. Becker, et al, 217 Ind.
524, 29 N.E. (2d) 560 (1940), 131 A.L.R. 1074 (1940).
This case is also noted under the section on Insurance.
Plaintiff, a beneficiary of a life policy, demanded pay-
ment from defendants who were officers and directors of an
insurance company, an Indiana corporation, by reason of a
contract of insurance between the insurance company and
one Howland by the terms of which the company agreed
that, upon the death of Howland, it would pay to the bene-
ficiary the sum of $1,000.00. The theory of the case was
that defendants were liable because of a statute of West
Virginia which imposed a liability upon agents of foreign
insurance companies for carrying on unauthorized business
in West Virginia. The solicitation for the insurance and
the receipt of the policy each occurred in West Virginia.
The defendant denied liability, but offered to pay to the
beneficiary all sums which Howland the insured had paid as
premiums for the certificate, without naming any specific
amount. The plaintiff answered saying that, since the As-
sociation (defendant) would not pay him what was due,
he desired that it send him the amounts that had been paid
as premiums. The Association mailed him a check for $7.00
which, it was stipulated, was the total amount Howland, the
insured, had paid. The plaintiff did not cash the checks and
from this fact the court finds no satisfaction of an accord
and hence no discharge of the Association's obligation.
The facts appear to show a bilateral accord agreement.
In the opinion the court said ordinarily either of the parties
to an accord agreement is free to rescind the accord at any
time before satisfaction. This statement, as applied to bi-
lateral contracts of accord, appears to be new law. True,
either party may breach the accord but to rescind it is an-
other matter. Because there has been no satisfaction, it
does not follow there has been no breach of the accord. The
4. Supra n. 2.
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plaintiff appears to have breached an executory bilateral
accord contract to accept $7.00 in full satisfaction. If so,
the breachee would ordinarily have a remedy either to sue
for damages or for specific performance.'
Possibly this point was not stressed in the brief and
argument. If so, one perhaps should not conclude that this
case is a precedent for a rule that any accord may be "re-
scinded" by either party with the result that no cause of
action arises from the breach of an accord agreement.
Release, Rescission of-Mutual Mistake. Crane Company et
al. v. Newman, 111 Ind. App. 273, 37 N.E. (2d) 732
(1941).
Newman was injured by a fall into Crane Company's
unlighted elevator shaft. Upon the payment by Crane Com-
pany to Newman of $140.00, Newman signed a release.
Thereafter, Newman discovered injuries more serious
than he thought existed when he signed the release and
brought an action to recover for the after-discovered in-
juries. The release was pleaded as a defense. The Court
held the facts showed a mutual mistake and thus the re-
lease was a voidable contract which could be avoided by
either party upon proper procedure.
Rescission of a contract for mutual mistake is common,
but a mistake by one party only is not sufficient of itself
to make the contract voidable.
The language of the release in question is to the effect
that Newman did "release, acquit and discharge . . from
any and all liability, now accrued or hereafter to accrue on
account of any and all claims or causes of action which I
now or may hereafter have . . . in any way arising from
any and all injuries " due to his fall, would appear
to make clear that the Crane Company intended to cover all
injuries whether then known or not. However, the Court
bases its decision on mutual mistake. Hence one should rec-
ognize that no change in the statement of the ordinary rule
1. See Indiana Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Walters, 221 Ind.
642, 50 N.E. (2d) 868 (1943), where the Court said 'By
refusing or failing to pay the agreed amount, be it called an
accord or a compromise, the obligor is in no position to complain
if the obligee abandons the compromise and resorts to his original
cause of action. But if he chooses to sue on the compromtse agree-
ment we see no good reason why the action ought not be." (Italics
ours) See also Restatement, Contracts (1932) Sec. 417 (c) (d).
[Vol. 21
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has been made but one should at the same time recognize
that the case possibly brings general releases within the rule
of rescission for mutual mistake when the releasor discovers
facts after signing the release of which he was unaware
when he signed.
Sales--Taxation. Smith v. Sparks Milling Company, 219
Ind. 576, 39 N.E. (2d) 125 (1942).
Smith, a baker, contracted with the Sparks Milling Com-
pany for the purchase of flour. A paragraph of the con-
tract provided: "It is, therefore, agreed and understood that
if, after the date of this contract, the commodities and/or
containers, or other items . . . shall become subject to an
increase in taxes or to any new or additional tax or taxes
other than those included in the price thereof, (if the seller
shall be required by law to collect such additional taxes),
then, in that event, said increase or additional taxes shall
be added to the price hereof; and correspondingly, if any tax
included in the price hereof shall be decreased or abated,
then in that event, said decrease or abatement shall be de-
ducted from the price hereof."
In accordance with this provision, Smith paid $1.38 per
barrel more for the flour which was the amount of the tax.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act was declared unconsti-
tutional and Smith brought the action to recover the amount
paid for such tax. Held, recovery allowed.
The Court, after a review of several cases, declared
there are two general types of sales contracts which pro-
vide for the payment of taxes by the purchaser of goods in
the event taxes must be paid. One type includes the tax as
a part of the purchase price while the other type separates
the tax from the purchase price of the goods and requires
its payment by purchaser as a distinct fund separate from
the purchase price. In the first type the Court held no
recovery of taxes paid is allowed but in the second type of
taxes paid by the purchaser is generally allowed when, for
some reason, the tax need not be paid to the government by
the party who collected it for that purpose.
The Court construed the paragraph set out above to
be of the second type and allowed recovery. The complain-
ant alleged he had not passed on the tax to the consumer.
Since the Court based its decision on contractual grounds
1946]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
and not on quasi contract, such an allegation by complainant
may not have been necessary as it would appear to be neces-
sary had the basis of recovery been on quasi contract.'
Construction-Meaning of words. Haworth v. Hubbard, 220
Ind. 611, 44 N.E. (2d) 967 (1942), 144 A.L.R. 887
(1942).
In a contract providing for a performance "at any
tne" the Court held that such words cannot be construed
to mean "within a reasonable tine". The Court recognized
a split of authority on the point but squarely held that the
words "any tine" mean in perpetuity with no departure
from such meaning except to avoid absurd, repugnant or
inconsistent results. Dissent by Shake, J. with concurrence
by Richman, C. J
Third Party Beneficiaries-Right to Sue on Sealed Contract.
VanOrman v. VanOrman, 112 Ind. App. 394, 41 N.E.
(2d) 693 (1942).
Whether or not sealed contracts are effective in Indiana
as at common law appears still to be an open question.' But
one of the results of an instrument under seal, i.e., that a
person who is not a party to the contract cannot sue upon it,
was denied in this case of first impression in Indiana. The
issue as to whether a beneficiary under a sealed contract
could sue upon it was squarely presented and decided, in
the following language:
"Persuaded by the reasoning in the cases from which we
have quoted, and bearing in mind that it has long been estab-
lished as the law of this State that the third party beneficiary
is the real party in interest, the solution of the question in
hand is completed by our statute which carries the following
provision: 'Every action must be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided in the
next section, but this section shall not be deemed to authorize
the assignment of a thing in action not arising out of contract.'
(Sec.) 2-201, Burns' 1933."
1. See DePauw Plate Glass Co. v. City of Alexandria, 152 Ind. 443,
52 N.E. 608 (1899), and Woodward, The Law of Quasi Contracts,
Sec. 24 (1913).
1. Gavit, Indiana Pleading and Practice, Sec. 234 (2), (1942).
[Vol. 21
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Contracts: When Written or Oral-Statute of Limitations.
Kirmse v. City of Gary, 114 Ind. App. 558, 51 N.E. (2d)
883 (1944).
The Indiana statute of limitations on contracts not
in writing is six years, and on written contracts for the pay-
ment of money it is ten years.
Kirmse was appointed as a member of the Gary police
department and was notified by letter on January 4, 1926,
from the Board of Safety of Gary, of his appointment. The
same day he took the oath, furnished bond and began the
performance of his duties. On January 23, 1930, he was
illegally discharged. In 1939, he commenced this action for
breach of contract. The City of Gary pleaded the six-
year statute of limitations. Held, that since the contract
was in writing, the six-year statute did not apply.
Performance-Impossibility-Knowledge of Promissor. Lud-
low v. Free, 222 Ind. 568, 55 N.E. (2d) 318 (1944).
What appears to be a first holding in Indiana, although
a number of other states hold likewise, is one to the effect
that an impossibility of performance does not prevent the
formation of a contract nor excuse the promissor for fail-
ure to perform if he knew at time of promise that the prom-
ise or condition could not be performed, if the promisee was
unaware of such impossibility. The promissor, in such a
case, is held to have promised an absolute liability free from
the impossibility factor.
Acceptance of Counter-Offer. Foltz et al. v. Evans, 113
Ind. App. 596, 49 N.E. (2d) 358 (1943).
Evans made an offer in writing to purchase real estate
from Indiana Yards, Inc., the owner. The offer provided
that it would be void unless accepted in writing. Indiana
Yards, Inc., through its agent, Foltz, wrote on the reverse
side of the paper containing the offer the following:
"This offer accepted subject to the following conditions.
1. That Herbert S. Evans and wife are accepted by the
Prudential Life Ins. Co. as substitute mortgagor
thereby releasing present mortgagor of any liability
under the law.
2. Allowance for lighting fixtures to be $40.00 Retail,
Allowance for Wall paper & hanging to be $60.00




The conditions set out above were agreed to by Evans
and he later obtained a letter from the mortgagee that he
would be an acceptable substitute mortgagor.
The Court held that the writing as set out above consti-
tuted a counter-offer which was accepted by Evans, the
counter-offeree, even though his acceptance were not in writ-
ing. The provision in Evans' original offer as regards
acceptance in writing did not apply to the counter-offer made
by Indiana Yards, Inc., the Court held. This result appears
to be familiar and sound. But on the question of what a
counter-offer embraces in its scope the Court recognized at
least two views: one expressed in the case of Todorovich v.
Kinnickine Mut. Loan & Building Ass., 238 Wis. 39, 298
N.W. 226 (1941), 135 A.L.R. 818 (1941) wherein it was
held that by making a counter-offer, the original offeree
rejects the terms of the original offer sn toto. But the
Court did not conceive this to be the correct rule. Instead
it said:
"We believe the better rule to be that the counter-offer
includes all of the terms and conditions of the original offer
not inconsistent with those of the counter-offer in so far as the
terms and conditions of the agreement itself are concerned,
for it seems to us that any other rule would render most count-
er-offers entirely nugatory, since few of them undertake by
their own terms to cover the entire proposition. In other
words, an offer to purchase on certain conditions, accepted
subject to new conditions which are in turn accepted by the
original offeror produces a contract the terms of which con-
sist of the original offer as amended or changed by the counter-
offer. This principle, while not announced, is recognized in
many cases."
The case contains some very good statements on various
contracts questions which could be profitably read as a re-
fresher, but it is believed the point discussed above is the
only phase of the opinion showing a first holding in Indiana.
Quasi Contract Distinguished-Illegality Moslander v. Mos-
lander's Estate, 110 Ind. App. 122, 38 N.E. (2d) 268
(1941)
Jane Moslander and Charles Moslander were divorced on
December 13, 1905, at which time the custody of Grace
Moslander, their child, aged eleven, was given to Jane Mos-
lander, and the custody of George Moslander, their child,
aged thirteen years, was given to Charles Moslander. The
414 [Vol. 21
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parties remained separated during a short period after the
divorce. Thereafter, Jane Moslander and her daughter, Grace,
returned to the farm and home of Charles Moslander and
from that time in 1905, until the death of Charles Moslander
in 1940, with a possible exception of two or three months,
Jane Moslander lived at the home, performed household work,
and occupied the same bed with Charles Moslander. The
parties were never remarried. Upon the death of Charles
Moslander, Jane Moslander filed a claim against Charles
Moslander's estate for services rendered the decedent during
his lifetime. The claim was disallowed and transferred to a
circuit court for trial. At the close of plaintiff's evidence,
defendant's motion for a directed verdict was sustained. On
appeal, the decision was reversed and the cause was remanded.
In the opinion the Court expressed itself in part as
follows:
"It is our opinion that the minds of reasonable men would
differ as to whether the services of appellant were performed
under an agreement by which she was to receive compensation
therefor, and under such circumstances a trial court could
not properly withdraw the case from the jury and direct a
verdict. Where a divorced wife returns to her former home
and aids, through a long period of years, in the rearing of the
children and the accumulation of a large amount of property
by the former husband, by performing valuable servces, with-
out any legal relationship which will permit her to inherit or
receive any of the accumulated property in the event of his
death, we cannot say, if we follow the dictates of reason and
justice or the common understanding of men, that a presump-
tion will arise that such services were gratuitously performed.
Where such a situation exists it is for the jury to determine,
from all the facts, conditions and circumstances, whether the
parties intended to contract for compensation therefor."
From the above quotation it is not clear whether the
decision is based on quasi contract or on contract, but from
other language in the opinion one may infer that the first
and last sentences of the above quotation are expressed for
the purpose of showing that the services were not rendered
gratuitously. If so, it seems to follow that the basis of the
decision is quasi contract rather than contract.
The Court expressly stated that no contention was raised
by the defendant that any illicit relationship existed between
the plaintiff and decedent which was a part of the considera-
tion for the performance of household services. Hence one
19461
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should not conclude that, if such a contention had been made,
the result would have been the same.
The Court pointed out that, in other jurisdictions, on
the question whether a woman who in good faith lives with a
man under the mistaken belief, caused by his fraud, that they
are lawfully married, the woman may recover upon an implied
contract the value of the services rendered during the period
of the supposed marriage. The theory of these cases is the
unjust enrichment of the estate of the supposed husband. The
Court recognized that a minority of jurisdictions have denied
compensation under similar circumstances upon the ground
that the wife's services were performed gratuitously. The
Court concluded that the majority view reflected the better
reasoning and, even though no fraud by the supposed hus-
band was alleged, remanded the case for new trial.
A further history of this controversy is reported in
Kitch, Adminmstrator v. Moslander, 114 Ind. App. 74, 50
N.E. (2d) 933 (1943) which is an appeal from the decision
reached in the retrial of the case in accord with the remand.
In the retrial the question as regards illicit relations was
presented to the jury by an instruction which the appellate
court approved in the following language:
"Appellant's chief objection to this instruction is that it
contravenes that rule of law which precludes recovery upon
a contract where part of the services claimed are immoral or
illegal on the theory that the court or jury under such cir-
cumstances as are presented by the facts of the instant case,
cannot separate the moral from the immoral consideration.
In using this rule as the basis of his attack the appellant
overlooks or disregards the essential element of the rule, i.e.,
the term 'consideration.' Where the illicit sexual intercourse
does not enter into the consideration for the contract, such
contract is not invalidated by the fact that the parties sus-
tain unlawful relations. Kurtz v. Frank (1881), 76 Ind. 594,
40 Am. Rep. 275; Henderson v. Spratlen (1908), 44 Colo, 278,
98 P. 14, 19 L. R. A. (N.S.) 655; Einmerson v. B.otkin (1910),
26 Okla. 218, 109 P 531, 138 Am. St. Rep. 953, 29 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 76, 48 Alb. L. J. 66; 10 Ind. L. J. 279."
The second case is also of interest and importance to
lawyers who are employed on a contingent fee basis. The
risk of dismissal of a suit after arduous labor by counsel
inheres in such arrangements for fees, and the second case
should be read for enlightenment on that problem.
[Vol. 21
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Third Party Beneficiary Contract Distinguished from Trust.
Newlin et al. v. Newlin, 114 Ind. App. 574, 52 N. E. (2d)
503 (1944).
Allen Newlin died testate in Illinois and some question
appeared as regards the execution of his will. In order to
obviate the question, the heirs and beneficiaries conveyed
testator's property to the executor, as trustee, by an in-
strument substantially containing the trust provisions of the
will by which the trustee was to pay the indebtedness of the
trust estate from the assets of the estate. The trustee prom-
ised Theresa Newlin to pay two promissory notes she held
against the deceased and she thereupon filed no claim against
the estate. The notes were paid in part by the trustee and
Theresa sued for balance due, and recovered judgment against
the trustee both in his trustee and personal capacity. On
appeal, the Court sustained the judgment against the trustee
in his trustee capacity but reversed as regards the trustee
in his personal capacity. No Indiana precedent is cited by
the Court, hence it appears to be a first impression Indiana
decision. The Court's language on the point is as follows:
"It makes no great difference whether the trust be regard-
ed as having been created by the will of the testator or by
transfer internvuos, but assuming, as the parties apparently
have, that the agreement and deed of trust was necessary and
that its execution, and acceptance by the trustee, effectuated
the trust, we are of the opinion that it did not, so far as ap-
pellee was concerned, amount to a contract for the benefit of
the appellee as a third party beneficiary, but created a trust re-
lationship not only as between the trustee and the heirs of
the deceased, but also as between the trustee and the appellee,
for by the agreement the trustee did not assume a personal lia-
bility to the appellee in consideration of the transfer of the
property, but on the contrary was required to pay the indebt-
edness from the assets of the trust estate. See American Law
Institute, Restatement Law of Trusts, (Sec.) 14. Moreover
whether the appellee became a creditor of the trust, or a bene-
ficiary under it, is a question of the intention of the grantors,
and we believe that the instrument itself reveals that it was
intended to accomplish the result above mentioned. Restate-
ment Trusts, (Sec.) 330h. The appellee manifested her willing-
ness to accept the benefits of the trust when she accepted the
trustee's assurances of payment, and negleted to file her claim
against the decedent's estate.
"No discretion was vested in the trustee with respect to
the payment of the debts owed by the deceased. Given assets
for the purpose, he was required to pay them immediately and
1946]
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unconditionally, and that being true, the appellee as a benefi-
ciary had the right to maintain an action at law to collect,
American Law Institute, Restatement Law of Trusts, (Sec.)
198; Cavanagh et al v. O'Connor et al. (1920), 189 Iowa 171,
176 N. W 881, regardless of the existence of equitable reme-
dies."
Oil and Gas Leases-Construction-Implied Covenants. New
Harmony Realty Corporation v. Superior Oil Company,
108 Ind. App. 668, 31 N.E. (2d) 673 (1941).
The so-called "Indiana Rule" as regards oil and gas
leases, set out in Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. Littler, 162
Ind. 320, 70 N. E. 363 (1904), which implied a covenant to
drill a well, was not extended to a lease which provided in
express terms that no covenant implied in law shall change
the express terms fixing a definite time within which a well
was to he drilled.
Validity-Test for Determining. Maddox v. Yocum, 109 Ind.
App. 416, 31 N.E. (2d) 652 (1941)
In determining whether or not a contract is invalid
because in violation of a statute, it depends upon whether
or not the cause of action on the contract is predicated on
or arises out of an illegal transaction or is a cause of action
collateral to an illegal transaction. The Court adopted the
language of a Pennsylvania case as a fair statement of the
rule in Indiana, as follows:
The test, whether a demand connected with an illegal
transaction can be enforced at law, is whether the plaintiff
requires the aid of the illegal transaction to establish his
case.
LEGISLATION
Acts 1941, Acts 1943, Special Session 1944. No legislation has
been found which appears to change the general law of
contracts in relation to offer and acceptance, consideration,
formalities, joint and several duties and rights, capacity of
parties, third party beneficiaries, assignment, statute of
frauds, statute of limitations, interpretation, conditions, dis-
charge, illegality, breach or remedies thereon.
Acts 1945
Capacity of Minors. Chapter 12, by emergency legis-
lation, provides that any person under the age of twenty-one
[-Vol. 21
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years authorized to participate in the rights, privileges and
benefits conferred by the Federal Servicemen's Readjust-
ment Act of 1944, and the infant wife of any such person,
can make effective contracts which are necessary to the full
realization of the rights, privileges and benefits conferred
under that Act, provided they are otherwise competent to
make contracts.
Teacher's Contract - Cancellation Clause - Marriage as
Grounds for Dismissal. Ops. Ind. Att'y. Gen. (1944)
p. 341.
A member of the State Board of Education requested
an opinion as to whether or not the following clause inserted
in the Uniform Teachers' Contract is binding on both parties:
"Marriage of any woman teacher after entering into a
contract to teach in said schools, shall, of itself, operate as a
cancellation of this contract fromand after date of such mar-
riage without notice from first party; and second party hereby
expressly agrees to this regulation and to be bound thereby."
The official opinion pointed out that Burns' 1943 Supp.)
Sec. 28-4330 requires all teachers' contracts to be uniform,
and in the form prescribed by the State Superintendent of
Public Instruction, without amendment, and concluded that
the clause in the contract prohibiting married women from
teaching would be invalid as a contract provision. But, the
opinion further stated, if a school corporation had a rule
prohibiting married women from teaching, such rule could
be enforced, provided notice and hearing were given as re-
quired by Burns' (1933) Sec. 28-4308.
1944 Opinons Attorney General, 354.
Assignment of Wages by Employee. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen.
(1944) p. 354.
The Commissioner of Labor requested an opinion as to
whether or not the Indiana statutes forbid a procedure where-
by the employee who obtains tools from his employer is re-
quired to sign the following form:
"Notice-You are responsible for the above articles.
If they are lost or abused they will be charged to
you."
The official opinion cited Burns' (1933) Sec. 40-201,
relating to the assignment of future wages, and concluded
that the signed form did not constitute an assignment of
19461
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wages but instead a mere right of set-off. If the employee
acquiesced, at the tune of payment to him of his wages, in
the retention by the employer of an amount due to the loss
of tools, such would constitute a satisfaction of the employer's
claim. But, if the employee demanded his wages in full, the
statute requires payment in full, leaving the employer to en-
force his claim by due process of law.
1944 Oprntons Attorney General, 431.
Building and Loan Investments. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1944)
p. 431.
The Supervisor, Building and Loan Division, Department
of Financial Institutions, requested an opinion as to whether
or not a building and loan association might legally purchase
real estate upon which there was an outstanding contract
of sale, provided the contract purchaser becomes a member
of the building and loan association.
The official opinion cited Burns' (1933 R. S., Pocket
Supp.) Sec. 18-2123, relating to investments of building and
loan associations, and concluded that a building and loan
association may purchase real estate upon which there is al-
ready an outstanding contract of purchase, provided the con-
tract purchaser becomes a member of the building and loan
association as provided in its by-laws, and the real estate is
sold to the purchaser at cost as provided in the statutes.
It was expressly stated that the opinion was not in-
tended to apply to leases with options to purchase.
SALES
Legislaton
Sales: Receiver"s, Fire, etc., Sales, Regulation of.
Chapter 198, Acts of 1943, provides that a license must
first be obtained from the County Clerk before advertisement
for a sale, or the sale of goods as insurance, salvage, removal,
closing out, going out of business, liquidation, bankrupt, re-
ceiver's, mortgage, insolvent, assignee's, executor's, admin-
istrator's, trustee's, or creditor's sales or that it is a fire
sale. It is provided however that clearance sales or closing
out of seasonal merchandise and sales by order of court are




Receivership-Insurance Commissioner Jurisdiction. North-
land, Trustee v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co., 216
Ind. 689, 25 N.E. (2d) 325 (1940).
Northern States Life Insurance Company had a receiver
appointed by Lake Superior Court in 1939; thereafter the re-
ceiver contracted with Lincoln National Life Insurance Com-
pany to assume obligations of the Northern Company and to
have a lien on the "net equity" of policyholders in assets of
Northern. Lincoln was to hold legal title to assets with equit-
able title in a Trustee. Lincoln was to account and furnish
statement to the Court, the Trustee and Commissioner of In-
surance, and when approved by Commissioner it was to be
conclusive and binding. In January, 1939, a report was filed
by Lincoln. The Trustee and a policyholder (for herself and
others) filed exceptions. Motion to dismiss exceptions on the
ground that the Insurance Commissioner had exclusive con-
trol. Motion granted below. Appealed. Held, reversed.
When assets of an insurance company are in the hands
of an Equity Court, accounting must be made to the Court
and the Court may not delegate its duty to Insurance Com-
missioner. Hence, the Court must first approve the report
before it is submitted to the Insurance Commissioner.
Construction-Riders-Signatures. Automobile Underwriters,
Inc. et al. v. Jeanette Camp, by Next Friend, et al. 217
Ind. 328, 28 N.E. (2d) 68, 128 A.L.R. 1024 (1940).
Where unsigned riders were pasted to policy at time of
its delivery, they thus became a part of the policy notwith-
standing a provision in the body of the policy to the effect
that endorsements must be signed by the assured.
This particular point is noted since it appears to be the
first time the exact question has been decided in: Indiana.
Definition of Employee. Hoosier Casualty Co. v. Miers, 217
Ind. 400, 27 N.E. (2d) 342 (1940).
The Hoosier Casualty Company issued an automobile
liability policy to Peterson by the terms of which members
of his household" and employees of the assured were excluded.
Plaintiff Miers was employed by Peterson as bartender from
4 o'clock P.M. to 11 o'clock P.M. While Miers was an invitee
of Peterson on a hunting trip, at about 2 o'clock P.M., Peter-
1946]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
son negligently drove his automobile causing injuries to Miers
who then filed suit against the Hoosier Casualty Company
based upon its policy of insurance held by Peterson. The Cas-
ualty Company defended on one ground (among others) that
Miers was an "employee" at the time of the injury and thus
was excluded from the benefits of the policy. Held, for plain-
tiff on the reasoning that "employee", as used in the policy,
included only those who, at the tune of injury, were under
the control of the "employer" in the course of the employment.
The court found an analogy in the case of the commission of
a tort by an "employee" while outside and separate from his
employment and cited Polk Sanitary Milk Co. v. Berry, 106
Ind. App. 29, 17 N.E. (2d) 860 (1938) as illustrative. This
case presents no departure from case law established before
1940 on this point but does present a first holding in Indiana
on the construction of the term "employee" in an indemnity
contract.
Contracts-Tender-Rescission. National Life and Accdent
Insurance Company v. Ransbottom, 217 Ind. 452, 28 N.E.
(2d) 78 (1940).
Where an insurance policy contract is subject to recission
on the ground that insured was afflicted with cancer at time
of issuance of the policy, it is only necessary to offer to restore
the consideration to the insured and it is not necessary to pay
the consideration into court.
Although the Court stated in the opinion that such a re-
sult is clearly discernable from the authorities, the case is
noted because it appears to be a first such decision on an
insurance contract in Indiana.
Personal Liability Agents and Directors. Karvalsky -. Becker,
et al. 217 Ind. 524, 29 N.E. (2d) 560, 131 A.L.A.
1074 (1940).
This case is noted also in the section on Contracts.
From an insurance standpoint the case involves the lia-
bility of officers of an Indiana Corporation on an insurance
policy delivered in the state of West Virginia without comply-
ing with the statute of that state authorizing the doing of
business there by foreign insurance companies. The statute
imposed a personal liability upon the officers and directors
of the corporation for the unauthorized business.
The West Virginia statute of limitations on actions for
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penalties or forfeitures was one year. The court held that the
Indiana statute of limitations was applicable and the limita-
tion in West Virginia was not. See the note in 131 A.L.R.
1074.
Disability benefits-Suicide. Prudental Insurance Company
of America v. Rich, 222 Ind. 231, 52 N.E. (2d) 624
(1944).
The insured was issued a policy providing for disability
benefits. In an action on the policy by insured the insurer
defended on the ground that insured's disability was the proxi-
mate result of self-inflicted wounds when he was of sound
mind. Held, for insured.
The case is one of first impression in Indiana. The
Court reviews several cases supporting the contentions of
each side and concludes that unless th epolicy specifies that
the insurer will not be liable in the event of suicide or at-
tempted suicide by insured while sane then such a contingency
may be no defense.
Process--Jurisdiction of Courts-Service on Insurance Com-
missioner. General Amercan Life Insurance Company v.
Carter, 222 Ind. 557, 54 N.E. (2d) 944 (4944).
Where insured, beneficiary and insurer were all non-
residents and no contact with the state existed except the
service of process upon the Insurance Commissioner under a
statute providing that foreign insurance companies doing
business in the state should execute a power of attorney
authorizing service upon the Insurance Commissioner it was
held that service in such a situation was beyond the scope of
the statute. The statute was construed so as to provide for
such service only in actions arising out of contracts made
within the state or with residents of the state.
Statutory Interpretation-Rating Bureau. Department of In-
surance of Indiana et al. v. Merchants Fire Ins. Co. of
Indiana-Department of Insurance of Indiana et al. v.
Indiana Retail Merchants Ass'n Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 57
N.E. (2d) 62 (1944).
An Indiana statute, Burns' Ann. St. Section 39-4310, 1940
Replacement, requires every fire insurance company to main-
tain, or to be a member of, a rating bureau, and that no com-
pany or rating bureau shall charge or fix any rate which
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discriminates unfairly between risks in the application of like
charges and credits, or which discriminates against risks of
essentially the same hazard.
Under this statute insurance companies were allowed to
charge less rates than prescribed by the bureau but they were
not allowed to change classifications or methods of classifying
insurance risks established by the rating bureau.
This case is the first court interpretation of this statute
on the question involved.
Taxation of Foreign Insurance Corporations. State v. Pru-
dental Ins. Co. of America, Newark, N. J., - Ind.
,64 N.E. (2d) 150 (1945).
Although this case primarily involves questions of taxa-
tion and interstate commerce it was an insurance company
that was taxed. One interested in the broad field of law ap-
plicable to insurance companies should therefore be familiar
with the case.
The question was whether or not the Indiana insurance
premium tax upon the privilege of doing business in the state
by foreign insurance companies was constitutional under the
commerce clause and the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment in the light of United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Assoczatton, 322 U.S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162, 88
L. Ed. 1440 (1944), which held that the business of insurance
is interstate commerce.
The Court upheld the tax as not an undue burden upon
interstate commerce and as not violative of the equal protec-
tion clause of the 14th Amendment.
Notice and Proof of Loss-Condition Precedent Excused.
Guardian Lsfe Insurance Company of Amerca v. Brack-
ett, 108 Ind. App. 442, 27 N.E. (2d) 103 (1940).
Guardian Life issued a policy to Brackett providing for
certain benefits in the event of permanent total disability of
the insured. The policy contained a provision fixing the tune
of payment for such disability at a time subsequent to the
receipt of due proof and fixing the time of making due proof
at and during the continuance of the policy and before default
in payment of premiums. Brackett suffered a sunstroke caus-
ing him to become unsound in mind and made no "due proof"
of his disability.
The question of whether or not insanity is a sufficient
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excuse for the insured's failure to perform the condition prece-
dent of the policy was decided in the insured's favor in the
following quotation from the opinion:
"The policy in the instant case contained a provision fixing
the time of payment for disability at a time subsequent to
receipt of "due proof" and fixing the time of making "due
proof" at and during the continuance of the policy and before
default in payment of premium. This provision was a manda-
tory one and required some act to be done as a condition
precedent to the right to recover for total disability, and should
be "read with an exception saving the rights of the assured
from forfeiture for failure to comply therewith where he is
totally incapacitated from acting in the matter and the con-
tract of insurance was entered into m contemplation thereof,
and that exception became a part of the policy the same as if
embodied therein in exact language."
The Court recognized the diverse decisions from other
jurisdictions on the point involved and expressly made no
attempt to reconcile them. The specific question of whether
or not insanity is a sufficient excuse for failure to give "due
proof" of disability under the terms of an insurance policy
appears not to have been decided before by an Indiana Court.
Hence the caes appears to be one of first impression by an
Indiana appellate court.
Father's Action for Loss of Child's Services. Automobile Un-
derwriters, Inc. v. Camp et al., 109 Ind. App. 389, 32 N.E.
(2d) 112 (1941).
Automobile Underwriters, Inc. issued a policy to Sum-
mers promising "to pay any loss by reason of liability imposed
by law upon the subscriber . . . for damages on account of
bodily injury including death resulting therefrom accidentally
inflicted or alleged to have been inflicted upon any person."
The policy excluded claims for "injuries to the occupants of
the insured automobile."
The father of an occupant of Summers' automobile who
was injured recovered a judgment against Summers for loss
of services of his child. In this action by the father against
Automobile Underwriters to have funds applied to the pay-
ment of the judgment against Summers, the Court allowed
recovery on the ground that the father's cause of action for
loss of his child's services is distinct and separate from the
cause of action the child may have and hence the clause of
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the policy excluding occupants is not applicable to the father's
cause of action.
The case is noted because it appears to be a first Indiana
decision on the point involved.
Policy-Notice as to Time of Termination-Construction-
Waiver Based on Estoppel. Lincoln Natonal Life Insur-
ance Company v. Sobel, 110 Ind. App. 831, 35 N.E. (2d)
121, 37 N.E. (2d) 698 (1941).
1. An insurance policy was delivered while subdivision
9 of Sec. 1, Ch. 195, Acts of 1925, was in effect. (Substantial-
ly the same provision is found in subdivision 9 of Sec. 151,
Ch. 162, Acts of 1935). The statute required insurance poli-
cies to contain a provision that the failure to pay any policy
loan, automatic premium loan, or interest thereon should not
void the policy unless the total indebtedness equaled or ex-
ceeded the cash surrender value, and in no event until 30 days
after notice thereof had been mailed to insured or assignee.
The policy contained the required provision. The insurance
company on July 7, 1933, sent the notice. August 7, 1933,
was the date the total indebtedness would equal or exceed the
cash surrender value of the policy which would lapse the
policy if proper notice were given.
On the question as to whether or not the 30-day notice
may be given before the date of excess of loan over cash
surrender value the Court held the prior notice sufficient.
The Court recognized contrary holdings in various jurisdic-
tions but based its conclusion, by analogy, on Lincoln National
Life Insurance Company v Hammer, 41 F. (2d) 12 (1930)
wherein it was held that promptness of payment of premiums
was essential. The Court then concluded that promptness of
payment of loans and interest was likewise essential and that
the 30-day notice prior to the date of excess of loan over cash
surrender value was sufficient.
2.- The Court refused to apply the usual rule of con-
struction, i. e., that a policy is to be construed most favorably
to the insured because the term in the policy needing con-
struction was taken from the statute. It should be noted that
the statute did not require the provision to be contained in
policies covering substandard risks which the one in question
was. Stevenson, J. dissented on this point.
3. The case also presents a decision on the requirements
of waiver in Indiana which in the past have been a bit hazy
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due to apparently conflicting decisions. This case holds that
a provision in an insurance policy which expressly limits the
power to change the terms of the policy to certain designated
individuals cannot be waived by agents of the company who
are mere solicitors.
Insurance: Due Proof of Disability. Moore et al. v. Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Company, 110 Ind. App. 480, S9 N.E.
(2d) 488 (1942).
The Insurance Company issued a 20-year endowment
policy to Delbert E. Moore on February 1, 1917. The policy
contained a provision that the Company would waive payment
of premiums upon "due proof" that insured was wholly and
permanently disabled. The only evidence as regards notice
or "due proof" of insured's disability was a statement by his
mother made to the Company's premium collection agent to
the effect that the insured was sick at Camp Shelby. The
Court held that "due proof" in a policy meant more than the
time when notice must be given. It includes also the sub-
stance or subject matter of the disability. The proof must be
"of something" and must show that the insured was wholly
and permanently disabled and prevented from performance
of any work for compensation or profit.
The decision appears to be the first one by an Indiana
Court on the specific point.
Vacancy Clause-Failure to Return Premium-Waiver of
Right to Forfeiture. Farmers' Conservative Mutual In-
surance Company v. Neddo, 111 Ind. App. 1, 40 N.E.
(2d) 401 (1942).
Insurance company issued a fire insurance policy to
Neddo on two buildings. The policy contained a provision
voiding the policy if a building be or became vacant or un-
occupied and so remain for ten days. One of the buildings
burned and after the fire the insurance company first learned
that it had been unoccupied for a period longer than ten days.
The company however did not return or offer to return the un-
earned portion of the premium paid by insured. The Court
held that the company had waived its right to avoid the policy
because of its failure to return or offer to return the premium.
The Court based its decision on Insurance Co., etc. v. In-
diana Reduction Co., 65 Ind. App. 330, 117 N.E. 273 (1917)
which dealt with a situation where gasoline was kept on the
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premises, and concluded the waiver should likewise be effec-
tive in a no-vacancy provision even though the breach of the
condition was not discovered until after the fire.
Construction of Policy Provisions. Shadow v. Standard Ac-
cident Insurance Company, 111 Id. App. 19, 39 N.E.
(2d) 493 (1942).
Sec. 1, Ch. 180, Acts Indiana General Assembly 1931,
approved March 14, was reenacted as Sec. 177, Indiana In-
surance Law, Ch. 162, Acts 1935, Sec. 39-4309, Burns' 1940
Replacement, and contains, among other provisions, the fol-
lowing-
"No such policy shall be issued or delivered m this state
to the owner of a motor vehicle, by any domestic or foreign
corporation, insurance underwriters, association or other in-
surer authorized to do business in this state, unless there shall
be contained within such policy a provision insuring such owner
against liability for damages for death or injury to person or
property resulting from negligence in the operation of such
motor vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by
any person legally using or operating the same with the per-
mission, expressed or implied, of such owner."'
Ch. 179, Acts Indiana General Assembly 1931, approved
March 13, was reenacted as Ch. 113, Acts 1935, Sec. 47-1036,
Burns' 1940 Replacement, and provides that a motor vehicle
liability policy may be issued in this state which shall either:
(1) Insure the person named therein, "and any other person
using or responsible for the use" of a motor vehicle, with the
consent, express or implied, of such insured against loss from
the liability imposed by law upon such insured or upon such
other person for injuries to person or property growing out
of the operation of such automobile; or, (2) insure the per-
son named therein against loss from liability imposed by law
upon such insured for injuries to person or property growing
out of the operation of such automobile.
Plaintiff was injured by the operator of an automobile
owned by the West Terre Haute Motor Corporation. He re-
covered a personal judgment of $1000.00 against the operator
because of his negligence. The West Terre Haute Motor Cor-
poration was not liable for the negligence of the operator
because no relationship of principal and agent or master and
servant existed between them, although the automobile was
being driven with the consent of the corporation.
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The West Terre Haute Motor Corporation held a policy
of insurance of Defendant, insuring the motor corporation
against liability for damages arising out of bodily injuries
sustained by any person not employed by the insured as a
result of any accident by reason of the ownership, operation
or maintenance of any automobile by the assured.
The plaintiff contended that this policy of insurance
inured to his benefit by reason of Sec. 39-4309, Burns' 1940
Replacement, set out above.
The Court refused to overrule the case of Spicklemeier v.
T. H. Mastin Co., 107 Ind. App. 350, 24 N.E. (2d) 797
(1940), in which it was held that Sec. 39-4309, Burns' 1940
Replacement, afforded protection to the owner of the automo-
bile against such liability as was imposed by law against him.
Therein the Court said:
"Liability of the owner is the condition insured against
and is the condition precedent on which the obligation of the
insurance carrier depends. It was not the purpose of this statute
to provide that everybody who might drive the owner's car with
his permission, express or implied, should be insured against
liability for negligence in its operation."
The Court thus construed two possibly conflicting stat-
utes, originally approved on consecutive days, as being in
accord. The practical result of the holding, as regards its
effect on motor vehicle insurance, is that omnibus coverage
is not required to be read into every policy. A policy insuring
the owner only is sufficient under the statutes.
Change of Beneficiary by Divorce. Herdman v. McCormick
et al., ill Ind. App. 169, 40 N.E. (2d) 1009 (1942).
Insured named his wife as beneficiary in a mutual life
insurance policy. Five days before insured's death, his wife
divorced him and had her maiden name restored. The policy
provided as follows:
"And if any person now or hereafter designated by me to
receive the death benefit shall not be living, or shall be in-
capacitated for executing the requisite receipt and release, or
if there shall be no suck persov, the death benefits shall be pay-
able as provided in the regulations of the relief department
for such event."
The Court distinguished the case of Farra v. Braman, 171
Ind. 529, 86 N.E. 843 (1909) which allowed the divorced wife
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to recover under a policy which provided that "death benefits
shall be payable to my wife, Eva J. Ried, of Ft. Wayne, In-
diana, if living at the time of my death and notwithdrawn as
my beneficiary, or to such person or persons as I shall sub-
sequently duly designate in writing in substitution therefor,
". In the instant case the Court construed the policy pro-
vision set out above as containing three conditions which
might operate to change a designated beneficiary even though
no change in writing were made by the insured. Those con-
ditions are: (1) In the event the designated beneficiary
should not be living; (2) in the event the designated bene-
ficiary should be incapacitated; and, (3) in the event there
should be no such person. The Court held that condition (3)
was applicable and so allowed the parents as second designated
beneficiaries to recover.
Beneficiary. Beene v. Gibraltar Industrial Life Ins. Co. et al.,
Ind. App. ,63 N.E. (2d) 299 (1945).
The case involves the question as to whether or not a
named beneficiary who kills the insured shall forfeit any
rights as such named beneficiary. The Court recognized that
an "unlawful and felonious" killing is sometimes stated to be
the rule, but held that "intentional and wrongful" killing is
the proper wording.
Legtslaton.
Remnsurance-Investments. Chapter 115, Acts of 1941,
passed measures relating to the authority of insurance corpor-
ations to merge, consolidate and to reinsure.
A summary of these provisions appears in 17 Ind. Law
Journal, 169 (1941).
Directors, Qualifications of. Chapter 127, Acts of 1941,
amended Chapter 162, Section 89, Acts of 1935, by providing
that in the case of a company's writing only physician's or
dentists' liability insurance, a director shall be either a policy-
holder, or one who has had five years or more of actual
experience in the management or underwriting of such kind
of insurance.
"Indiana Insurance Law," Amendments. Chapter 189,
Acts of 1943, amended Sections 151, 153 and 169, the "In-
diana Insurance Law," Chapter 162, Acts of 1935, and added
five new sections. The changes relate to required policy pro-
visions, deposit of securities, the classification of group poli-
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cies and the company's right to select a transition date.
Investments rn Polictes. Chapter 250 of Acts of 1943
provided that executors, administrators, guardians, trustees,
receivers or other fiduciaries shall have power in such capaci-
ties to invest in "Life, endowment or annuity contracts of
legal reserve life insurance companies duly licensed by the
insurance commissioner for the State of Indiana to transact
business within the state. The purchase of contracts author-
ized by this subsection shall be limited however, to executors
or the successors to their powers when specifically authorized
by will, and to guardians and trusteed on authorization of the
Court having probate jurisdiction over the guardianship or
trust. Such contracts may be issued on the life or lives of a
ward or wards, a beneficiary or beneficiaries of a trust fund,
or according to the terms of a will, or upon the life or lives
of persons in whom such ward or beneficiary has an insurable
interest. Such contracts shall be so drawn by the insuring
company, that the proceeds or avails thereof shall be the sole
property of the person or persons whose funds are invested
therein."
This power of investment is in addition to that given
by Ch. 149, Acts of 1941.
Group Insarance, What Constitutes. Chapter 311, Acts
of 1943, amended Section 166 of the "Indiana Insurance Law,"
Chapter 162, Acts of 1935, by adding to the classes of group
life insurance (1) life insurance covering the members of
agricultural cooperatives written under policies issued to the
Indiana Farm Burea Cooperative Association, Inc., or its
affiliates, and (2) life insurance covering employees of the
Indiana Statewide Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., and units
thereof written under a policy issued to Indiana Statewide
Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Chapter 59, Acts of 1945, further amended Section 166
of Chapter 162 by adding to the classes of group life insur-
ance written under a policy covering the executive, super-
visory, sale and professional employees of bona fide members
of any voluntary industrial association under a policy issued
to such association.
Workmen's Compensation, Premiums for. Chapter 167,
Acts of 1941, amended Sections 13, 14, 19 and 21 of Chapter
323, Acts of 1935, so as to provide that the Department of




Old Age Assistance, Liens Against. Chapter 201, Acts of
1941, repealed Sections 44, 45, 46, 47 and 48, and amended
Section 38 of Chapter 1, Acts of Special Session of 1936, so
as to remove the lien on the estate property of one granted
old age assistance.
Foreign Fees and Taxes of Domestic Companies. Chap-
ter 123, Acts of 1945, empowers every domestic insurer to
pay taxes and fees imposed by any state or the District of
Columbia and directs that no officer, director or trustee of
any insurer shall be subject to any personal liability by reason
of any such payment provided the payment is prior to a de-
termination of invalidity of the tax by a court having final
appellate jurisdiction.
The Department of Insurance. Chapter 351, Acts of 1945,
recreated "The Department of Insurance" and carried for-
ward the powers, rights, duties and liabilities of "The Depart-
ment of Insurance" which was established as a division of the
Department of Audit and Control of the State of Indiana,
by the insurance law, Chapter 162, Acts 1935. Apparently
some doubt existed as to the status of The Department of
Insurance which was caused by administrative legislation since
1935. Hence, the 1945 legislation was enacted. One essential
change from the 1935 act was to take from the Governor
and give to the Commissioner of Insurance the power to re-
move the actuary and other employees of the Commissioner's
office.
Withholding for Teachers' Group Insurance. Chapter 84,
Acts of 1945, authorized school boards upon written request
of teachers to withhold from salaries amounts of money to
pay for group insurance, provided that any dividends shall be
paid to the teachers.
Group Insurance for State Guard. Chapter 134, Acts of
1945, authorized the Adjutant General. with the Governor's
approval, to obtain group insurance for members of the mili-
tary forces of the state.
Legal Reserve Life Companies, Investments. Chapter 175,
Acts of 1945, is the latest legislation listing investments of
domestic life insurance companies and contains too much de-
tail for summary. The whole of Chapter 175 should be ex-
amined.
Fraternal Beneficiary Associations, Investments-Certi-
ficates, Valuation of-Benefits for Children. Chapter 149,
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Acts of 1945, amended Section 189, "Indiana Insurance Law,"
Chapter 162, Acts of 1935, so as to enlarge the class of
securities in which fraternal beneficiary associations may in-
vest funds. Chapter 162, Acts of 1935, restricted such in-
vestments to securities permitted by the laws of Indiana for
the investment of the assets of life insurance companies for
reserve deposits. Chapter 149, Acts of 1945, deleted the words
"for reserve deposits."
Section 193 of "Indiana Insurance Law" was also amend-
ed by Chapter 149, Acts of 1945, by deleting from Section 193
the following:
"The rate of interest used in the valuation shall not be
greater than the net rate which the society earned on its ad-
mitted assets during the year preceding the date of the valua-
tion less one-fourth of one per cent."
Section 200 of "Indiana Insurance Law" was also amend-
ed by Chapter 149, Acts of 1945, by removing the limitation
on the amount of insurance to be issued to children under 16
years of age.
Opinions of the Attorney General.
Authority of Company to Take Promissory Notes for
Stock Sales. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1940) p. 7. An insurance
company does not violate the Indiana Insurance law of 1935
by taking promissory notes for its sales of stock provided
that proper action has been taken by the insurance company
authorizing the receipt of notes in payment for stock and
that there is reasonable ground for believing such notes are
good and collectible and of the value for which they are
received.
The opinion directed attention to Section 74 of the In-
diana Insurance Law, Chapter 162, Acts of 1935, which es-
tablished the minimum amount of capital stock which must
be paid up in money in order to authorize the company to
write certain types of insurance. Promissory notes are not,
in the Attorney General's opinion, the equivalent of cash
which is required by Section 74.
Reinsurance-Charter Rights, Transfer of. Ops. Ind.
Att'y Gen. (1940) p. 15. Members of an insurance company
organized under Chapter 195, Acts of 1897, have no power to
transfer charter rights. It was also ruled that an expression
by five members in an assessment insurance company to con-
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tinue their insurance in the original company is not sufficient
to continue the original company under Section 1, Chapter
195, Acts of 1897.
Ownership of Own Stock by Insurance Company. Ops.
Ind. Att'y Gen. (1940) p. 27. Section 147 of the "Indiana
Insurance Law" means that a life insurance company may
not invest in its own stock unless it is accepted in good faith
to protect tie company's interest either in payment of or to
secure a debt due the company.
Foreign Insurance Compantes, Powers of. Ops. Ind. Att'y
Gen. p. 66. Section 227 of the "Indiana Insurance Law"
of 1935 means that foreign insurance companies, licensed to
do business in Indiana before the passage of the "Indiana
Insurance Law" of 1935, may continue to write the kinds of
insurance provided for in their charters or articles of incor-
poration.
Power of Farmers Mutual Company to Insure Urban
Property. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1940) p. 128. Under Section
6, Chapter 145, Acts of 1919, as amended by Section 3, Chap-
ter 243, Acts of 1927, mutual farm insurance companies may
insure property situated in other than rural districts, includ-
ing villages or unincorporated towns, provided that the prop-
erty insured is not only "owned principally by farmers" but
also that it "has some such relation or connection with farm-
ing interests as naturally to fall within the category of farm
property even though not strictly such or used in connection
with actual farm operations."
Life Insurance Broker Not Authorized. Ops. Ind. Atvy
Gen. (1940) p.191. The "Indiana Insurance Law" of 1935
means that the law does not contemplate nor authorize an
insurance broker, either as a corporation or a natural person,
to write life insurance.
"Fleet Policy" Coverage. Ops. Att'y Gen. (1940) p. 198.
Section 178 of the "Indiana Insurance Law," providing that
school buses, even though operated by owners under contract
to use them exclusively for school purposes and under the
control and direction of school authorities, could not be in-
cluded or insured in a "fleet policy" along with a fleet of
motor vehicles owned by school authorities.
Authority of Politcal Sub-Dwswions to Purchase Insur-
ance Against Public Liability. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1940) p.
216. Chapter 245, Acts of 1935, does not impose any liability
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upon the state or its sub-divisions for the tortious acts of its
agents employed in a governmental capacity, and since there
was no state statute imposing such liability then the purchase
of insurance against such non-existent liability would not be
authorized and could not, if purchased, be legally paid for.
Department, Jurisdiction of. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1941)
p. 78. In an opinion to the Insurance Commissioner, the At-
torney General construed the "Indiana Insurance Law," in
an opinion analyzing several cases from other jurisdictions,
to the effect that the Indiana Department of Insurance has
jurisdiction in rate-making under the "Workmen's Compen-
sation Rating Bureau Law," Chapter 323, Acts of 1935.
He overruled, in part, the opinion of December 10, 1938,
and held that a stock company is authorized to write par-
ticipating policies.
Right of Commissioner to Deny Issuance of Permit. Ops.
Ind. Att'y Gen. (1941) p. 144. Section 71, "Indiana Insurance
Law," Chapter 162, Acts 1935, means that no limit was set
by the statute upon the period of time which may elapse be-
tween the date that the Articles of Incorporation are ap-
proved by the Secretary of State and the date on which the
$10,000.00 as surety is posted with the Insurance Depart-
ment. He held that the Legislature did not expressly or im-
pliedly vest in the Insurance Commissioner the discretion
to deny the issuance of a permit to complete organization
upon a finding that the incorporators had violated the Insur-
ance Code, and that the Commissioner may accept the $10,-
000.00 and issue a permit to complete the organization in spite
of his knowledge that stock had been sold in violation of the
Insurance Code; provided that conditions precedent to the
issuance of such permit had been complied with.
Paid-In Capital Stock Requirement. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen.
(1941) p. 252. Section 74 of the "Indiana Insurance Law,"
Chapter 162, Acts of 1935, means that the entire amount of
stock, appraised at par, must be subscribed and paid for as a
requisite to the taking on of another line of casualty insur-
ance. The statute is not complied with by the realization of
the prescribed amount by the sale of stock at a premium.
The opinion distinguished "capital" from "capital stock"
and held that, generally, profits and surplus earnings do not
constitute "capital stock" or "capital" as the words are used
in Section 74 of the "Indiana Insurance Law."
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Merger Rights. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1941) p. 336. Sec-
tion 115 of the "Indiana Insurance Law" means that a char-
ter of an Indiana company cannot be expanded by merging
with a foreign fraternal benefit association. Consequently, an
Indiana stock legal reserve company merging with a fraternal
assessment association may not, after the merger, exercise
the association's right to make assessments or levy liens.
Group Policy, Validity of. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1941) p.
338. Section 166 (b) (4) of the Indiana Insurance Code,
Chapter 162, Acts of 1935, means that a group creditors'
policy where the insurance is limited to the first five years of
loans, even though the life of the loan is twenty years, is
valid.
Premum Tax on Insolvent Company. Ops. Att'y Gen.
(1941) p. 361. The Attorney General held that the Indiana
privilege premium tax was not to be charged upon premiums
collected by an Illinois insurance company charged by court
order to collect such premiums on outstanding policies of an
insolvent Illinois insurance company which had been author-
ized to and did engage in business in Indiana.
Rates-Expense Ration-Durations from Experience
Rate-Minimum Premiums. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1941) p.
427. Section 1 of Chapter 167, Acts of 1941, means that a
company is not prohibited from charging a premium rate
less than the maximum rate approved by the department and
that there is no statutory restriction upon the companies re-
quiring the same premium rate to be granted all similarly
situated.
He also held that under Section 2 of Chapter 167, Acts
of 1941, it is mandatory that each company file with the
Insurance Department a schedule of its expense and that the
Department is to approve any charge made to cover expenses
before they become effective, but, he held, the Statute does
not require that the expense charge, when so approved, shall
be used on every risk written by the company. The legisla-
tive intent was to permit companies to exercise the widest
latitude in the matter of cutting rates below a maximum
premium rate approved by the Department.
Section 3 of Chapter 167, Acts of 1941, was construed
to mean that the Department is expected to approve devia-




Section 4 of Chapter 323, Acts of 1935, was construed
to mean that the Workmen's Compensation Rating Bureau
shall establish minimum premiums, and he defined a minimum
premium in workaan's compensation insurance as the lowest
amount for which a policy may be written for any period not
to exceed one year and distinguished a "minimum premium"
from "premium rate."
County Farmers' Mutual Insurance Companies, Reports
of. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1942) p. 191. Section 39-2014,
Burns' Indiana Statutes, 1940 Replacement, means that coun-
ty farmers' mutual fire insurance companies, except com-
panies organized by special charter, are required to make
and file annually with the Commissioner of Insurance such
a report as he may require. He pointed out that Chapter 140,
Acts of 1915, does not deal with county farmers' mutual fire
insurance companies.
Classification of Insurance Agents. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen.
(1943) p. 50. Section 209 of the "Indiana Insurance Law"
imposes an unconstitutional regulation, in that it classified
insurance agents upon the sole basis of the method of pay-
ment for insurance. Part of Section 209 provides that only
those representatives of insurance companies may qualify for
a license who operate "on a commission basis only." This
provision, in the Attorney General's opinion, was arbitrary
and a violation of both the Indiana and the U. S. constitutions.
Burial Associations. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1943) p.
594. Section 11, Chapter 165, Acts of 1939, means that
a contract by an Indiana funeral director with a foreign
insurance company, whereby the funeral director may handle
all the funerals of policy holders of such insurance company
in his territory, comes within the prohibition of the statute
and is therefore illegal.
Power of Municipal Corporations to Pay Premium on
Group Policies. Ops. Ind. Att'y Gen. (1944). p. 394. It is not
legal for cities, counties, townships or school districts to buy
group insurance for their teachers and employees and pay all
or part of the cost. Also, there is no authority to make in-
voluntary deductions from the salaries of such employees. He
pointed out that he did not mean to imply that a voluntary
purchase of group insurance by any particular group of pub-
lic employees was illegal, provided the employees paid the
premiums themselves. And he further indicated that volun-
tary check-off for insurance premium would be valid.
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